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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal addresses the limited issue of whether defendants/appellants, C. Michael 
Coppedge and Karen Coppedge (the "Coppedges") are entitled to an award of a reasonable 
attorney fee at trial. After entry of the judgment directed by this Court following the first appeal 
in this matter1 and after determining that the Coppedges were the prevailing parties for the 
purposes of costs in what unquestionably is an action to enforce a contract and involving 
commercial transaction, the trial court denied the Coppedges any fees because it thought it 
"unfair ... to saddle the plaintiff' with the Coppedges' fees. Imposing its own sense of justice, 
the trial court refused to even award the Coppedges that portion of the fees they incurred which 
were specifically and solely attributable to plaintiffs' claims against them. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action comes before this Court for the second time. The first time, this Court held 
the trial court erred in finding a covenant in a partnership/joint venture buyout agreement that 
required the Coppedges to pay $12,000.00 per month to plaintiffs as a condition of being able to 
do business in the Coeur d'Alene area was not an overbroad, unenforceable covenant not to 
complete. In so doing, this Court reversed the trial court's order for a new trial and a judgment 
based on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs with directions plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
On May 12, 2008, as instructed by this Court, the trial court entered a judgment of 
1 Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 181 P.3d450 (2008). 
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dismissal in favor of the Coppedges (LR 13)2. On May 13, 2008, the Coppedges filed their 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees (LR 19), a Motion to Fix Attorneys Fees (LR 16) and 
an Affidavit in Support thereof (LR 23). 
Plaintiffs responded on May 27, 2008 with a Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees (LR 49). 
In their motion, plaintiffs argued that the Coppedges were not the prevailing parties since they 
did not prevail on their counterclaim. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that any award of fees 
should have been minimal, blaming the Copp edges for not bringing the issue of the 
enforceability of the contract provision they so vigorously defended through the highest court of 
this State before the trial court in a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs suggested that had 
the Coppedges made their argument earlier "it is possible" the case would have been terminated 
. . 
before the bulk of the fees were incurred LR 52). 
The Coppedges replied to phuntiffs' motion on June 3, 2008 (LR 55). In their response, 
the Coppedges pointed out to the trial court the procedural and substantive failings of the 
plaintiffs' arguments. They correctly apprised the trial court that the legal issue of the 
enforceability of the covenant as plaintiffs were then advocating was not new to the case and 
should not have been a surprise to plaintiffs. The issue was also one that could not be addressed 
in a summary judgment motion since its application rested on first resolving whether the contract 
created a franchise relationship as plaintiffs alleged and advocated until they conceded that point 
on the first day of trial (Tr 9, L 12). The Coppedges also pointed out to the trial court that they 
had prevailed on tlie fundamental claim in the case, the issue that had prompted the lawsuit, 
2 
"LR" refers to 1he "limited" Clerk's Transcript per this Court's Order Augmenting Record of August 22, 2008. 
"LTr" shall refer to the "limited" Reporter's Transcript. 
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brought the parties to court, and forced the Coppedges to raise in defense all issues that the 
operative facts of the case mandated be presented. Lastly, the Coppedges advised the trial court 
of the fact that the Coppedges had offered in a formal mediation of their dispute with plaintiff 
( one that occurred several years before this action was even filed) to settle all claims by paying 
plaintiffs a very substantial sum of money (LR 62). 
At the hearing on the parties' respective motions, the trial court denied the Coppedges' 
Motion to Fix Attorneys Fees and granted plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Fees. In so doing, the 
trial judge's reasoning was at odds with established Idaho law in two major respects. First, after 
correctly finding that the Coppedges the prevailing parties under IRCP 54( d)(l )(B) and were 
thus entitled to costs "as a matter of right" (LTr 18, L 4; LR 78), the trial judge ruled that the 
award of fees was still discretionary. The trial judge then held that he considered the case a 
"split decision" since the Coppedges did not prevail on their counterclaims (LTr 18, L 15). The 
reasoning extended even to post-trial fees that related solely to plaintiffs' efforts to secure an 
. additur or new trial that had nothing whatsoever to do with the Coppedges counterclaim (LTr 22, 
L2). 
The second ground announced by the trial court explained what was truly behind its 
decision to deny the Coppedges fees. The trial judge announced that had the issue of the breadth 
of the covenant been brought to his attention earlier he "may well have had a better shot at 
making the right decision regarding that issue ifit wasn't in the heat of trial" (LTr 18, L 25). He 
went on to say that he felt "badly that fees were expended by both parties after that decision of 
mine during trial" and then opined that he might have done a better job had the issue been 
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brought to him earlier (LTr 19, L 4). Speculating that a trial might have been avoided had he had 
more time to consider the issue and even though he could not fault the Coppedges for the timing 
of their challenge to the enforceability of the covenant, the trial judge thought it "unfair to saddle 
the plaintiff with all fees really for the whole litigation" (LTr 19, L18). Translated to the bottom 
line, the trial court's order meant that plaintiffs were not responsible for "any" of the fees the 
Coppedges incurred in defending a case that would not have been brought had plaintiffs properly 
analyzed their case at the outset. 
Refusing to consider the fact that thousands of dollars in fees had been incurred by the 
Coppedges defending plaintiffs' multiple efforts to secure a new3 trial or that the litigation, not 
just the trial, could have been avoided altogether had the Coppedges attempts to settle the case 
been accepted (LTr 20, L 16), the trial court entered its order holding the Coppedges the 
prevailing parties for the purposes of costs, but not for attorneys fees (LR 77). 
This appeal followed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to award fees to the prevailing party in litigation 
for breach of contract involving a commercial transaction? 
2. Alternatively, did the trial court err in refusing to award fees to the prevailing 
parties for defending matters solely related to plaintiffs' claim for damages? 
3. Was the trial court precluded from considering the pre-litigation settlement 
negotiations of the parties when applying the factors outlined in IRCP 54(e)(3)? 
3 Plaintiffs' post-trial actions and the issues raised are detailed on pages 11-13 of the Coppedges' Opening Brief in 
the first appeal. 
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4. Are the Coppedges entitled to a reasonable attorney fee on appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
A Attorneys Fees - In General. An award of attorneys' fees to a party to a civil 
action requires the trial court to conduct a three-part analysis. First, the trial court must 
determine ifthere is a statutory or contractual basis authorizing an award of fees to the prevailing 
party. Second, if such a basis exists, the trial court must determine if the party seeking an award 
of fees is the prevailing party (IRCP 54(e)(l)). To do so, the trial court must conduct the 
discretionary analysis required by IRCP 54( d)(l)(B). Finally, if it determines a party prevailed 
in an action for which an award of fees is authorized, the trial court must determine, in the 
exercise of its sound discretion, the amount of fees to be awarded. To properly exercise its 
discretion, the trial court must consider, at a minimum, the 12 factors outlined in IRCP 54( e )(3) 
(Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Jones, 175 P.3d 795 (App. 2007)). 
B. The Coppedges Prevailed In An Action In Which An Award Of Fees Is 
Mandated. The first two elements of the three-part analysis required for the award ofreasonable 
attorneys' fees to the Coppedges are present. First, the plaintiffs' claims against the Coppedges 
were without question to recover on a contract and arose out of a commercial transaction 
between the parties. An award of fees was thus authorized to the prevailing party on two 
grounds under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
Second, the trial court found that the Coppedges were the prevailing parties under IRCP 
54(d)(l )(B) for the purposes of costs (LTr 18, L 4; LR 78). After so finding, the trial court 
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awarded the Coppedges 100% of the costs they incurred recoverable as a matter of right under 
IRCP 54(d)(l )(C) (R 19). Plaintiffs have not challenged that finding by cross-appeal. 
C. The Coppedges Are Entitled To Fees At Trial. As the prevailing parties in an 
action on a contract arising from a commercial transaction between the parties, the Coppedges . 
were "entitled'' to an award of fees under Idaho Code § 12~120(3) (Medical Recovery Services, 
LLC v. Jones, supra, at 798 (App. 2007); Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design 
Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,493 (2003); Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,412 (App. 
1983)). Once a trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, determines a party prevailed in 
an action governed by Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the court is "required to award costs and attorney 
fees" (Ervin Construction Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695 (1994)). 
The trial court in this case, however, perceived that despite its determination that the 
Coppedges were the prevailing parties and entitled to costs as a matter of right that an award of 
attorneys fees to the Coppedges was still a matter purely within its discretion (LTr 18, L 4). 
Instead of recognizing that the amount of fees to be awarded was a discretionary issue premised 
upon the application and analysis of the factors set forth in IRCP 54(e)(3), the trial court believed 
it had the option of simply denying fees altogether. Doing so was error. 
The trial court also erred on both grounds it recited to support its discretionary denial of 
fees to the Coppedges. First, after specifically finding that the Coppedges were the prevailing 
parties for the purposes of costs, the trial court make the wholly inconsistent observation that it 
considered the case a "split decision" since the Coppedges did not prevail on their counterclaims. 
That justification for its decision, however, is not only belied by its finding the Coppedges were 
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the prevailing parties for the purposes of costs, but ignores (a) that the Coppedges won on the 
main issue in the case (the only issue that brought the parties to court) and (b) that the issues 
raised in the Coppedges' counterclaims would have been asserted in defense of plaintiffs claims 
anyway (R 16, Third Affirmative Defense). The same evidence, and thus the same time and 
effort, would have been introduced as to those defenses whether or not affirmative relief was 
sought. The Coppedges were thus in no different ( or inconsequently different) a position than 
the defendants in either Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716, 719 (2005) or 
Chadderdon v. King, supra.4 
Second, the trial court clearly decided to use what it perceived to be its discretionary right 
to deny an award of fees as a means "to vindicate its sense of justice beyond the judgment 
rendered", a factor impermissible under Idaho law (Medical Recovery Services, LLC, supra at 
799; Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 387 (App. 1986). While even hinting that 
righting a wrong as a motive for denying a fees award is error (Eighteen Mile Ranch, supra at 
720), the trial court here made clear that that was precisely its motivation. Supposedly without 
faulting the Coppedges and professing its sorrow for not making the correct decision as to the 
enforceability of the covenant upon which plaintiffs' entire case rested, the trial court stated 
unequivocally that it thought it would be unfair under the circumstances to place the costs of this 
litigation on plaintiffs (LTr 18, L 17 -19, L 21). 5 Boiled to the essence, the trial court felt it just 
4 In both cases, defendants who defeated the plaintiffs' claims were entitled to fees despite either losing or securing 
only a pyrrhic victory on their counterclaims. 
5 The Coppedges cannot be blamed for not giving the trial court the opportunity to make the correct decision. The 
issue of the enforceability of the covenant at issue was brought to the attention of the trial court in the Coppedges 
Trial Brief on October 17, 2005, one week before trial began (R 55). Before jury selection began, the issue was 
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tha,t the Coppedges bear all of the fees they incurred in defending a case that would not have 
been brought had plaintiffs properly analyzed their case at the outset or which largely would 
have been avoided had the trial court been given more time to rriake a correct decision as to 
plaintiffs' interpretation of the contract.6 The trial court was obviously employing its own view 
of equity rather than considering the factors required by IRCP 54( e )(3). 
D. The Coppedges Are Entitled To Their Fees Without Apportiomnent. Should this 
matter be remanded to the trial court, instructions should be given to the trial court that the fees 
to be awarded the Coppedges are not to be apportioned. 
In their counterclaim, the Coppedges asserted causes of action for fraud, breach of 
contract, unfair competition, and interference with a business advantage. The later two causes of 
action were not pursued at trial, with only the fraud and breach of contract claims being 
submitted to the jury. Evidence supporting both theories would have been presented in defense 
of the case after the trial court concluded the interpretation of the covenant plaintiffs wete 
advocating was not unenforceable whether or not a counterclaim was filed. 
The fact that the Coppedges did not recover on a defensive counterclaim that never would 
have be.en filed had plaintiffs not started a fight they legally should not have does not mean that 
the Coppedges were not the prevailing parties (Chadderdon v. King, supra). The Coppedges 
addressed with the trial court as one that would have to he resolved before the case was submitted to the jury (Tr I 0, 
L 1). Plaintiffs filed responsive briefmg on October 26, 2005 (R 155) and the matter was argued 2 days later at the 
conclusion of the evidence (Tr 1059, L 9). Nowhere in the record does the trial court complain that it did not have 
sufficient time to fully analyze the issues raised by the Coppedges or that it was caught by surprise. 
6 Presumably, based on its reasoning, the Coppedges would have been awarded fees had the trial court made the 
correct ruling as to the enforceability of the covenant. 
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prevailed on the only claim that mattered in this case, a claim plaintiffs valued at well over 
$1,000,000 (Tr 1124, L 8-Tr 1128, L 4) and one they thought justified the weeklongjury trial. 
More importantly, the trial court erred in refusing to consider the efforts made by the 
Coppedges to settle the case before this action was filed. At the hearing on plaintiffs' motion to 
disallow fees to the Coppedges, however, the trial court ruled that since the Coppedges were 
claiming a right to fees their claim was a "claim" within the meaning of IRE 408 (LTr 20, L 16). 
The trial court therefore refused to consider the fact that the Coppedges had offered to resolve all 
contractual issues between the parties on terms that, under the circumstances, were far superior 
to what plaintiffs achieved in this action (LR 62). In so doing, the trial court erred. 
In doing so, the trial court ignored not only the mandate ofIRCP 54(e)(3)(G) which 
requires the trial court to consider the amount involved and the results obtained, but numerous 
cases in which the settlement efforts of a party were considered in evaluating the award of fees 
after trial. For example, inEtcheverry Sheep Co: v. J. R. Simplot Co., 113 Idaho 15, 18 (1987) 
this Court, citingSigdestadv. Gold, 106 Idaho 693 (App. 1984), stated: 
" .... a district court is not precluded from considering pretrial settlement 
negotiations in determining whether the criteria of Rule 54(e)(l) have been 
established. " 
In Etcheverry, this.Court was dealing with a request for attorneys' fees under IC § 12-121, but 
the rationale should apply equally to a request under IC § 12-120. 
In accord is the case of Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349 (1983) in 
which the defendant's pre-litigation tender was a determinative issue. In Yellowpine, the 
plaintiff won a positive monetary award and defeated the defendant's counterclaim because the 
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defendant had not been able to prove any compensable damages. Despite that result, this Court 
held that as a matter oflaw the plaintiff was not the prevailing party and thus overturned the trial 
court's award of attorneys' fees. This Court found that the defendant had offered to pay what 
was determined by the trial court to be due before the lawsuit was filed and that the plaintiff had 
pursued the litigation demanding much more money than the defendant owed. 
The same result occurred in Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Jones, supra. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals found that a minimal award of fees to the prevailing plaintiff was 
appropriate since a high percentage of the fees incurred could have been avoided had the plaintiff 
properly addressed the defendant's settlement overtures (Id at 800). 
Clearly, by filing and pursuing this case to trial, plaintiffs "took a flier" that they could 
score more than what was offered them in settlement. The "result obtained" by the Coppedges 
was a complete defense of the only claim that motivated the filing of this lawsuit. The fact that 
the Coppedges were not successful on a defensive counterclaim that would not have been 
brought "but for" plaintiffs' decision to file suit changes nothing, nor would that fact have 
reduced the time expended in trial since those matters would have been raised in defense of 
plaintiffs' claims had no counterclaim been filed. 
E. Fees For Post-Trial Issues. After the jury's verdict, plaintiffs caused the 
Coppedges many thousands of dollars of expense in defending their multiple efforts to secure 
prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees and relief from what was a clearly disappointing jury 
verdict. Plaintiffs first filed a Motion for a New Trial or, in the alternative, an Additur, which 
necessitated extensive briefing and argument (R 221 -254, Tr 1237, L 1). At the same time, 
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virtµally 10 months after the jury's verdict, plaintiffs presented a form of judgment to the trial 
court in which also awarded prejudgment interest (R 216). That too required the Coppedges to 
incur further fees to oppose plaintiffs' request for interest on what was clearly not a liquidated 
sum (R 238, Tr 164, L 1 ). Plaintiffs followed with a second motion for a new trial (R 275) and a 
motion to fix attorneys fees at trial.7 Those motions also prompted extensive briefing (R 329-
336, Tr. 1274). Following the decision to grant a new trial, the Coppedges were also forced to 
oppose plaintiffs' effort to keep the liability portion of the verdict so that the only issue to be 
addressed on re-trial was the award of damages (R 359. - 364). 
Nothing that occurred after the jury verdict was entered had anything whatsoever to do 
with any defense or counterclaim of the Coppedges. One hundred percent of what transpired 
after trial was directly related to the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim against the Copp edges. 
The trial court refused, however, to award the Coppedges any post-trial fees even though it 
apparently agreed that those fees had nothing to do with the Coppedges' counterclaim (LTr 21, L 
22; 22, L 2). Doirig so was clear error. The Coppedges are at the very least entitled to an award 
of fees for defending themselves against plaintiffs' efforts to secure a "second bite" a recovering 
breach of contract damages against them. 
F. The Coppedges Are Entitled To Fees On Appeal. When an appeal in a case 
subject to IC § 12-120 concerns the entitlement to fees, as opposed to the amount of fees 
awarded, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of fees on appeal (Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. 
7Plaintiffs' motion to fix attorney's fees and the Coppedges' opposition thereto are not contained in the record, but 
are referenced in the reporter's transcript (Tr 1274, L 11). That motion was not decided given the trial court's grant 
ofa new trial (Tr 1299, L 6). 
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Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 263 (App. 2000)). This appeal clearly involves the Coppedges' 
entitlement to fees and thus an award of fees to them on appeal is proper. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
Dated: January 15, 2008 Dean&Kolt 
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